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Abstract 
 
This paper undertakes a comparative assessment of the development of competition in Botswana, Ethiopia 
and Nigeria. These three African countries have all sought to introduce domestic competition law since 
2000. The paper identifies the different factors that have contributed to the relative success in introducing 
competition law in Botswana, as compared to both the Nigerian and Ethiopian experience. The paper 
highlights the significance of both domestic and external factors in nurturing competition and good 
economic governance. It concludes that effective enforcement of competition law is founded on both 
internal and international dynamics. While domestic will for competition is a necessary precondition, the 
case of Botswana indicates how domestic reforms needed to be buttressed by capacity building and 
expertise from external sources, for the betterment of markets, producers and consumers.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction: 
 
While the importance of anti-trust or competition has been acknowledged for centuries, 1  in many 
developing and transition economies, competition law is still a recent innovation. Although many 
developing countries have been undertaking economic reforms towards market liberalization and 
privatisation, their efforts have oftentimes been undermined by either the lack of competition laws and 
policy aimed at regulating economic behaviour and structures for the benefit of the whole economy and 
society – producers and consumer; or where competition policy and law exists – lack of political will and 
experience to implement and enforce it.2 
 
Yet resource rich, developing countries are particularly prone to distorted market incentives and regulatory 
capture because government institutions are typically less developed and the temptations are strong. If no 
safeguards exist to prevent anti-competitive practices, firms can abuse their dominant market position 
through predatory behaviour to eliminate local competition, or through forming cartels and other market-
sharing agreements.3 Such anti-competitive behaviour functions to reduce choice, increases prices and 
generally denies consumers and other excluded producers the benefits of trade liberalization. This has an 
even more detrimental impact when the majority of the population live in conditions of relative poverty. 
                                                           
1 The authors are indebted to the valuable insights of Thula Kaira, George Lipimile and the anonymous referees and 
editors at the JAE. All errors remain the authors. 
2 Fox, Eleanor M., Competition, Development and Regional Integration: In Search of a Competition Law Fit for 
Developing Countries (October 1, 2012). Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 
Josef Drexl, Mor Bakhoum, Eleanor M. Fox, Michal Gal and David Gerber, eds. (Elgar 2012); NYU Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 11-04. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1761619 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1761619 
3 See R. A. Posner, ‘The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation’ (1975) 83 Journal of Political Economy 807; R. 
Pitofsky, ‘The Political Content of Antitrust’ (1979) 127 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 105; G. Amato, 
Antitrust and the Bounds of Power (Oxford, Hart, 1997) ch. 7. 
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This paper compares and contrasts the efforts to develop competition policy and law in three African 
countries – Botswana, Ethiopia and Nigeria – since 2000. Such a comparative approach is of value to 
identify both external and internal drivers that can and have been harnessed to establish competition 
regimes and overcome misguided policies or corrupt self-interest in the status quo. This comparative 
approach also offers insight into the different roles played by regional agreements in Africa, and how they 
can potentially support domestic reforms. Successive African Union decisions have fuelled this 
regionalising dynamic, in seeking to expedite regional economic integration with a view to forming a 
Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) by 2017, an economic union by 2019. The ultimate goal is to achieve 
full political and economic integration leading to the United States of Africa.4   
Effective and compatible laws promoting cooperation in implementing and enforcing competition will be 
an important component of African economic integration, for preventing firms from undermining the 
benefits of continent wide markets for African consumers and producers. This examination is therefore 
undertaken with the ultimate goal of identifying forces that can propel the creation of a competitive and 
vibrant African economy that protects consumers and producers from unfair and uncompetitive business 
practices.  
 
 
 
2. Background 
 
Competition policy concerns arose in Botswana less than two decades ago. In 2001, an economic mapping 
survey was conducted in response to rising levels of unemployment and stagnant growth. The survey report 
highlighted increasing anti-competitive dominance of foreign firms, with potential to undermine any wider 
economic reforms. This led to the development of a national competition policy, which was passed by 
Parliament in 2005.5  The Botswana National Competition Policy provided a coherent framework to 
integrate privatisation, deregulation, and liberalisation of trade and investment, which led to the 
establishment of the 2009 Competition Act. The Act created a Competition Authority and Competition 
Commission to enforce and promote it.6 Since then, competition policy and law enforcement in Botswana 
has progressed at a faster pace than regionally – under the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) trade agreement. Botswana ranked at 71 in the World Economic Forum Competitiveness Rankings 
and 35 out of 176 countries in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2016.7 
 
In Nigeria, concerns about anti-competitive practices undermining economic development led to the 
drafting of a Federal Competition Bill in 2002. This Bill sought to establish a Federal Competition 
Commission to prohibit restrictive contracts and business practices. However, this Bill was not enacted, 
along with a total of nine bills that have been presented at the National Assembly in a bid to create a legal 
framework for competition in Nigeria. More recently, a Bill For An Act To Provide For The Establishment 
Of The Nigerian Trade And Competition Commission And For Other Matters Connected 
Therewith” (NTCC Bill) in 2012 was presented to the upper legislative house, and also saw no significant 
enactment progress. 8 The lack of competition in any economy contributes to a reduction in consumer 
welfare, higher prices, with less choice, innovation and market dynamism; it also provides fertile ground for 
                                                           
4 African Union, 2005c:Assembly/AU/Dec.90(V), §3; Murithi 2008. See: African Continental Free Trade Area: 
Advancing Pan-African Integration. Some Considerations. UNCTAD, Geneva 2016. Available at:  
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webditc2016d5_en.pdf 
5 The Botswana Competition Policy. Ministry of Trade and Industry. 2005. Downloaded 8/9/2017 from: 
www.competitionauthority.co.bw/sites/default/files/National%20Competition%20Policy%20Botswana%202005.p
df 
6 Botswana Competition Act 2009 Part II, paras 4,5. Downloaded 8/9/2017 from: 
www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/bw/bw009en.pdf 
7 Downloaded 8/9/2017 from www.transparency.org/country/BWA 
8 Temiloluwa Osinowo argues that this repeated failure to enact a competition law is due to insufficient 
understanding of the nature and essence of the issue among politicians. T. Osinowo. Competition law in Nigeria. This day 
newspaper October 21, 2014. Downloaded 8/9/2017 from: www.vitaveritasllp.com/competition-law-in-nigeria/ 
3 
 
cartels, bid rigging and corruption.9 Nigeria’s World Bank 2015-6 Competitive Index was 124, and ranked 
for the second year at 136 out of 176 countries on the Transparency International Corruption Perception 
Index 2015, alongside Russia and Kirgizstan.10  
 
Somewhere in between these two experiences lies the case of Ethiopia, which despite adopting a free market 
economic policy in 1991, did not draft the Trade Practice Proclamation until 2003. While the Proclamation 
sought to secure fair competitive process through prevention and elimination of anti-competitive and unfair 
trade practice, and to safeguard the interest of consumers,11 it lacked comprehensive and targeted consumer 
protection provisions. This was addressed in the follow-up 2010 Proclamation,12 which established a new 
government agency - the Trade Practices and Consumers’ Protection Authority (TPCPA). The TPCPA was 
endowed with judicial functions, including imposing administrative measures, civil sanctions and 
compensations for consumers. This Proclamation was further amended in March 2014, comprehensively 
addressing anti-competitive practices and consumer protection. Yet the effective implementation and 
enforcement of this most recent Proclamation, based for the most part on international best practice, has 
not yet been forthcoming.13 This is reflected in Ethiopia’s World Economic Forum Competitive Ranking 
of 109 in 2015/16,14 and corruption perception ranking of 108 out of 176 countries.15 
 
The paper seeks through comparing the past 17 years in three African countries’ efforts to develop 
competition law and policy, to identify best domestic and external that can stimulate the necessary will to 
enforce competition policy and law.  The paper concludes that the successful experience of Botswana 
highlights that the general awareness of the importance of competition and good economic governance for 
consumers and producers initiated by a few individuals in the political and public arena, was supported by 
external factors, most notably utilising international expertise, cooperation and capacity building 
programmes. Even when the necessary domestic will is available, sustaining an effective domestic 
competition law also requires external drivers for reform. Domestic advocates for competition in Africa, 
should therefore buttress their efforts by harnessing external factors to drive competition reforms. These 
include not only international development agencies, most notably in this case UNCTAD, but also 
increasingly African regional initiatives in the form of the Continental Free Trade Agreement and the 
Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (TFTA) launched in June 2015, between COMESA, the East African 
Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as the African 
Competition Forum (AFC).  
 
 
3. Introducing Competition in Botswana:  another African success story 
 
An assessment of the development of competition policy and law in Botswana indicates that while the 
necessary will to implement competition policy has existed domestically, external factors have continually 
been harnessed where necessary. Although competition policy discussions can be traced back to 1997,16 it 
                                                           
9 Evenett , Simon J.; Levenstein, Margaret C.; and Suslow, Valerie Y., "International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons 
from the 1990s" (2001). Economics Department Working Paper Series. 89. 
www.scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper/89  
See for example: www.businesslive.co.za/bd/business-and-economy/2016-10-06-lack-of-competition-in-sa-enables-
cartel-conduct/; Or the National Stakeholders meeting on competition issues ‘Nigeria disadvantaged due to no 
competition law’. (23rd September 2008). 
10 http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016#table 
11Article 3 The Trade Practice Proclamation, No.329, 2003, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 9th Year No.49. 
12 Proclamation No 685/2010. 
13 UNCTAD is implementing a competition law enforcement capacity building programme in Ethiopa under 
funding from the Duchy of Luxembourg. 
14 World Economic Forum http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/competitiveness-
rankings/ 
15 http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016#table 
16http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/32799/1/Competition,%20Productivity%20and%20Pr
ivatisation.pdfCompetition, Productivity and Privatisation by Abdalla Gergis, BIDPA Paper number 13/1997. 
Botswana public policy makers, private sector and other African leaders from the Commonwealth shared 
experiences on public sector reform. This seminar was attended by all Botswana government ministries, heads of 
parastatals, BOCCIM, Botswana Chamber of Commerce, Trade Unions, Head of Commonwealth. 
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was not until a 2002 economic mapping survey report that reforms were initiated. UNCTAD was requested 
to support these reform initiatives, guiding the drafting of the economic mapping.17 This report revealed, 
among other things, that market dominance and substantial market power in some sectors where tendering 
for public procurement could be open to collusion amongst bidders in their respective markets.18 It further 
indicated that franchising and distance selling tended to exclude local firms. Regulation of market entry 
constituted obstacles to competition in some sectors such as utilities and telecommunications.19 
The Legislative Inventory of Botswana Laws Relevant for a Competition Policy ultimately concluded that 
almost every piece of legislation relating to or affecting business activity had some bearing or impact on 
competition in that legislation and regulation hindered competition in the market hence the need for 
reform.20 The 2005 National Development Plan subsequently put forward the objectives of the Botswana 
government’s Vision of 2016 as the diversification21 of the economy and improved productivity.22 This 
Plan was the result of more than three years of consultation and advocacy involving both internal and 
external stakeholders to develop a policy.23  
Over the next five years UNCTAD capacity building support guided the drafting of the competition policy, 
competition law, as well as awareness raising among Government and the private sector. It is heartening, 
in 2017, to see that Botswana’s Vision has been realised. It indicates the success of a comprehensive 
approach to develop a competition framework, from economic mapping, legislative inventory, policy and 
then law is possible. Although open to criticism from the private sector that the process took too long, the 
depth of this process and its inclusiveness grounded competition principles into the macro economic 
framework and made it easier for competition law enforcement to take root. 
 
3.1 Botswana competition policy and law 
The 2005 Botswana Competition Policy was promulgated to provide a framework designed to prevent and 
redress anticompetitive practices and conduct by firms and to create a business-friendly environment that 
encourages competition and efficient use of resources. The theory was that competition would promote 
investment and innovation, broaden choices for consumers, reduce monopoly rents and consumer prices 
and raise the quality of goods and services produced.24 The rationale for Botswana’s competition policy lay 
in the need to maximise the benefits of trade and investment liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation while 
protecting the benefits generated by competition from erosion by anticompetitive practices in a deregulated 
environment. The Policy also aimed to address problems related to the globalisation of cartels, abuse of 
market dominance and monopolisation of key sectors following the opening up of markets and the 
significant increase in cross- border trade, as well as investment flows.25  
Pursuant to these policy objectives, the Competition Act of Botswana was enacted in 2009. The Act 
provides for the establishment of the Competition Authority, its mandate, the regulation of competition in 
the economy, and matters incidental thereto. The Act is administered by the Competition Authority (CA). 
                                                           
17 This work was done under the UNDP country programme for Botswana with UNCTAD as the implementing 
agency. 
18 Para 2.2 National Competition Policy for Botswana Ministry of Trade and Industry July, 2005, Gaborone, 
Botswana.  www.mti.gov.bw/webfm_sen. Market dominance in the meat industry, the cement industry, the sugar 
industry, beverages, mining and the motor vehicle distribution sectors was unearthed. 
19 Ibid Para 2.4 For example, Section 4 of the Electricity Supply Act (CAP 73:01] gave precedence to the interests of 
the Botswana Power Corporation. 
 http://www.cuts-international.org/7up3/Botswana_CRR.pdf p.12 
20 Ibid Para 2.6 Therefore, the envisaged formulation of the Competition Law would take cognizance of this fact. 
21www.un.org/jsummit/html/prep_process/national_reports UN Country profile. See  
Botswana National Development Planning NDP8 p.17 “The aims of this policy are two-fold – to boost 
employment and to reduce the country’s risk of depending too heavily on a single commodity.” 
22 http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Botswana/Botswana%20EFA%20NPA.pdf also  Bidpa Paper 13/1997 
page 11. 
23 http://www.cuts-international.org/7up3/Botswana_CRR.pdf Preliminary Draft Report Competition Issues in 
Botswana. Monnane M Monnane. Botswana Institute for Development Analysis. 
24 Para 1.2 
25 Para 1.1 http://www.mti.gov.bw/webfm_sen 
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This is a statutory corporate body set up under the terms of section 4 of the Act, clothed with the legal 
powers and authority to carry out the functions specified in terms of section 5 of the Act.26 Section 5 
broadly sets out the powers of the CA “for the prevention of, and redress for, anti-competitive practices in 
the economy, and the removal of constraints on the free play of competition in the market”27 The CA is 
also empowered inter-alia to make rules for fair and transparent business practices, publicise such,28 regulate 
mergers29, educate the public about its functions30 and to advise the government on potential or actual anti-
competitive practices.31 One important function is to liaise “with and exchange information, knowledge 
and expertise with authorities entrusted with functions similar to those of the Authority, in other 
countries.”32 The CA investigates33 any breaches of the Act and prosecutes34 such breaches before the 
Competition Commission. The CA is headed by a CEO appointed by the Minister on recommendations 
of the Commission. The CEO holds office or a period of 5 years and the first CEO was an international 
expert, when it was evident that a domestic candidate with the necessary skill-set was not available in 
Botswana.35 
The Act also establishes a Competition Commission in terms of section 9 “which shall be the governing 
body of the Authority and shall be responsible for the direction of the affairs of the Authority.”36 Among 
its other duties, the Commission of seven officials appointed by the Minister from experts in commerce, 
industry, economics, law, commerce, public administration, 37  is empowered to adjudicate on matters 
brought before it by the Authority and to give general policy direction to the Authority.38 Control of 
restrictive agreements and dominant position is in part V which covers prohibited practices such as 
horizontal agreements,39 vertical agreements,40 and other vertical agreements,41 thresholds for determining 
prohibition,42 interconnected enterprises43and dominant position.44 These practices are prohibited per se, 
as they hinder competition and violate the Act. However, a trading enterprise can escape penalties even if 
it has violated the act. But this is only if the investigating authority reasonably expects that there will be 
offsetting benefits for the public directly attributable to the agreement.45 Under PART VI — Exemptions 
and assessment criteria paragraph 32 provides, inter alia, that where the Authority finds, on investigation that an 
agreement other than a horizontal agreement or a vertical agreement prohibited by section 25 and section 
26 (1) respectively prevents or substantially lessens competition, the Authority may, subject to section 34, 
                                                           
26 Sec 4 COMPETITION ACT, No. 17 of 2009 
http://www.competitionauthority.co.bw/sites/default/files/Competition%20Act%202009.pdf 
27 Sec 5( 1) 
28 Ibid 5( 2) (a) 
29 Ibid (b) 
30 See note 17 supra (d) 
31 Ibid 5(e) and 5(f) 
32 Ibid 5(i) 
33 5 k 
34 5 p 
35 Until 2011, Mr Thula Kaira was the CEO of the Zambian Competition Authority, where he worked for 11 years. 
36 Sec 9 
37 Sec 10 
38 Sec 9(2) 
39 Sec 25, horizontal agreement means an agreement between enterprises each of which operates, for the purpose of 
the agreement, in the same market and would therefore normally be actual or potential competitors in that market; 
40 Sec 26, vertical agreements are agreements between enterprises each of which operates, for the purposes of the 
agreement, at a different level of the production chain and relates to the conditions under which the parties may 
purchase, sell or resell certain goods or services. 
41Sec 27 “… if, following an investigation by the Authority, such agreement is found to have the object or effect of 
preventing or substantially lessening competition in a market for any goods or services in Botswana”. 
42 Sec 28 
43 Sec 29 (3) For the purposes of this section, bodies corporate are inter-connected if one of them is a subsidiary of 
the other or if both of them are subsidiaries of the same body corporate. 
44Sec 30- Dominant position means a situation in which one or more enterprises possess such economic strength in 
a market as to allow the enterprise or enterprises to adjust prices or output without effective constraint from 
competitors or potential competitors 
45 Sec 32. 
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grant an exemption from the prohibition if it can be reasonably expected that there will be offsetting 
benefits for the public directly attributable to the agreement in the form of —  
(a)  the maintenance of lower prices, higher quality or greater choice for consumers;  
(b)  the promotion or maintenance of the efficient production, distribution or provision of goods 
and services;  
(c)  the promotion of technical or economic progress in the production, distribution or provision 
of goods and services;  
(d)  the maintenance or promotion of exports from Botswana or employment in Botswana;  
(e)  the strategic or national interest of Botswana in relation to a particular economic activity being 
advanced;  
(f)  the provision of social benefits which outweigh the effects on competition;  
(g)  the agreement occurring within the context of a citizen empowerment initiative of 
Government; or  
(h)  the agreement in any other way enhancing the effectiveness of the Government’s programmes 
for the development of the economy of Botswana, including the programmes of industrial 
development and privatisation:  
Provided that the prevention or lessening of competition is proportionate to the benefits for the public and does not 
allow the enterprises concerned to eliminate competition completely in respect of a substantial part of the 
products or services in question. [Emphasis added] 
The Botswana Competition Policy of 2005 explicitly excludes from the ambit of the Competition Law,46 
inter alia, Public Utilities and Intellectual Property Rights:  
1. The provision of infrastructural facilities for public utilities such as land-line telecommunications, 
water, and electricity require huge capital outlays, which take long to recoup given the paucity of 
Botswana's population and the resultant small market base. Since this situation may constrain 
private sector investment in this sub-sector, Government may exclude and exempt the provision 
of some of the infrastructural facilities from this Policy.  
2. The aforementioned exclusions and exemptions notwithstanding, Government may include the 
provision of services such as public utility connections and distribution services within the ambit 
of this Policy.  
The Policy further recognises the important role intellectual property (patents, trade marks and copyrights) 
plays in Botswana's human and economic development endeavours and the need to protect and safeguard 
the interests of intellectual property rights-holders. Therefore, as a way of protecting intellectual property 
rights from infringement and to promote the development of creations and innovations, intellectual 
property rights will be exempted and excluded from the ambit of this Policy. Exceptions and exemptions 
to competition rules imply, prima facie, the benefits of competition and liberalising the economy can be 
blocked by these exceptions and exemptions. One such example is in the provision of energy by BPC. 
Despite building a new Power Plant at Morupule B, the plant has failed to produce 600MW of electricity 
since its completion in 2014. About 300MW have been produced resulting in massive power shortages. As 
a result, Botswana has continued to import electricity from ESKOM of South Africa at a further cost to 
the taxpayer.47 This is inefficient. A new Morepule B phase 11 Project for 600 MW is now under tender. 
Many SOEs are not performing well and several, including the Botswana Meat Commission, the Botswana 
Telecommunications Corporation (BTC) and the Botswana Development Corporation, have been 
embroiled in scandals involving alleged fraud and mismanagement.48 
                                                           
46 2005 Competition Policy (I)(ii) 
www.competitionauthority.co.bw/sites/default/files/National%20Competition%20Policy%20Botswana%202005.p
df 
47 http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=41662  [accessed 17/08/15] 
48 One former CEO and several employees of the BTC were indicted on corruption charges in 2012. 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204607.htm  
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3.2 Application of the Act: Success is in the climbing 
Working in collaboration through an MoU signed with the CA, Directorate on Corruption and Economic 
Crime (DCEC), and the Public Procurement Asset Disposal Board (PPADB), the Competition Authority 
CA’s has implemented its enforcement and advocacy powers under Section 5 of the Competition Act, to 
ensure that suspicious transactions and relevant information is exchanged. As a result of this MoU, the CA 
has more effectively intervened to remove anti-competitive conduct in the market including refusal to deal 
and removing barriers to entry in several cases involving the supply of sugar, explosives and physiotherapy 
equipment and fly ash.49 The Cement Market Inquiry, for example, uncovered an exclusive agreement 
between Botswana Power Corporation through Morupule Power Station, and one cement player PPC 
Botswana. A market enquiry was conducted under the auspices of an established external structure - the 
African Competition Forum - in collaboration with Botswana’s domestic Competition Authority, the 
DCEC and the PPADB. The investigation concluded that the fly ash at Morupule Power Station was given 
on a contractual basis making it difficult for other cement players to source it.50 The Authority established 
that this agreement was exclusive and anti-competitive in nature, as it created a barrier to access raw material 
(essential input). The duration of the agreement was over a period of 10 years, renewable every five years 
wherein PPC Botswana was the sole beneficiary of the fly ash while other players were forced to find 
alternate sources. Following the CA’s intervention, the agreement was terminated hence lifting barriers to 
the access of fly ash by other players.51  
 
A total of 61 cases of anti-competitive conduct were handled by the Authority during the 2013/14 review 
period. Out of these cases, 28 were brought forward from 2012/13, while 33 were new cases received 
during 2013/14. During the period under review, 25 cases were closed without referral to the Competition 
Commission, while six out of 19 reported cases involving cartels were referred to the Commission. There 
were no cases referred to the Commission for resale price maintenance or on abuse of dominance despite 
36 cases handled. In one case of abuse of dominance by an anchor tenant at Molapo Crossing Shopping 
Mall, the CA intervened and the matter was resolved without a referral. A total of 34 cases were carried 
forward to the 2014/15 financial year as investigations were still on-going in December 2015.52  
On bid rigging, the CA on 29th July 2013 received a complaint from a whistle blower concerning the 
awarding of a tender valued at 114million Pula to supply 1 500 000 units of infant milk formula in 400 
grams’ cans to the Ministry of Health.  The CA then initiated an inquiry to substantiate the allegations of 
bid rigging for the tender. Following analysis of the individual bids, the Authority had reasonable grounds 
to suspect that Creative Business Solutions (Pty) Ltd and Rabbit Group (Pty) Ltd had engaged in collusive 
tendering. The Authority then decided to investigate the matter and referred it to the Tribunal for 
adjudication following the conclusion of investigations.53  
                                                           
49www.competitionauthority.co.bw/sites/default/files/CA%20market%20studies%20press%20statement%2013%2
005%2014.pdf 
50 Fly ash is one of the residues generated by coal combustion and is used in the cement industry as an additive in 
the cement manufacturing process.  
51 Botswana Competition Bulletin. Issue 3. 2015. See: 
www.competitionauthority.co.bw/sites/default/files/Botswana%20Competition%20Bulletin%20Issue%203%20Vo
lume%203.pdf 
52 www.competitionauthority.co.bw/sites/default/files/Annual%20Report%202013-14-2.pdf p23 
53 ibid, p. 3 On the 2nd July 2015 the Competition Commission (Tribunal) sat to hear the matter between the 
Competition Authority and Rabbit Group and Creative Business Solutions concerning alleged bid-rigging of an 
infant milk formula tender worth P114 million. The Respondents Rabbit Group and Creative Business Solutions 
had raised preliminary points of law and argued that the complaint brought by the Competition Authority was not 
cognizable and that the Commission had no jurisdiction over the matter. They further argued that the complaint was 
referred to the Commission after the mandatory one year period. The Authority on the other hand argued that on a 
proper interpretation of the Competition Act, and taking all the circumstances into their proper perspective, the 
complaint was brought within the said one year statutory timeframe, and that the Commission had jurisdiction over 
the matter. After hearing the arguments from both parties, the Tribunal adjourned and reserved its ruling. 
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On mergers, the CA made determinations on 33 proposed mergers against a target of 25; thus, 32% above 
target in 2013/14.54 Out of the 33 merger cases that were determined in 2013/14, the Authority approved 
18 without conditions and 15 with conditions.55 No merger case was prohibited, as substantial lessening of 
competition, dominance and public interest concerns were addressed with appropriate remedies and 
conditions. While there have been numerous successes concerns have been raised that public interest 
considerations take precedence with the Authority emphasising local priorities, particularly the increasing 
levels of unemployment in Botswana, and public interest considerations have been a key part of the 
Authority’s decisions even where no competition concerns are raised.56 In 2012, 10 of the Authority’s 17 
publicly available merger decisions, either (i) imposed a condition that no job losses would occur as a result 
of the transaction, or (ii) include a commitment by the parties that no retrenchments or redundancies would 
occur as a result of the merger.57 
In January 2013, the Competition Authority prohibited the proposed merger between Medical Rescue 
International Botswana Limited (MRIB) and Botswana Medical Aid (BOMAID), which already held a 
majority share in MRIB. The Authority found that the transaction would not lead to the substantial 
lessening of competition in health care administration, emergency medical, call centre services and on-site 
medical clinics in Botswana, but rejected the merger on public interest grounds, holding that instead of 
selling more shares to BOMAID, MRIB should divest these shares to “other citizens.”58 Bomaid appealed 
to the Commission.59  Critics argued that the CA was not applying the Act in a balanced way.60 The public 
interest approach taken here was similar to that of South African Competition Law.61 Limits to the role of 
                                                           
54 http://www.competitionauthority.co.bw/sites/default/files/Annual%20Report%202013-14-2.pdf p 32 
55 See Annual Report supra at page 32. 
56 http://www.bowman.co.za/News-Blog/Blog/Competition-Law-in-Botswana 
In terms of section 59(1) of the Act, “[i]n assessing a  proposed merger, the Authority shall first determine whether 
the merger (a) would be likely to prevent or substantially lessen competition or to restrict trade or the provision of 
any service or to endanger the continuity of supplies or services; or (b) would be likely to result in any enterprise, 
including an enterprise which is not involved as a party in the proposed merger, acquiring a dominant position in a 
market” (my emphasis). Despite public interest considerations appearing secondary to the effect on competition in 
merger control assessment, the Authority’s decisions to date afford public interest considerations a prominent role 
in merger review, possibly losing focus of the objective of the Act as competition legislation, first and foremost. 
57 ibid 
58 Ibid. The decision seeks to ensure that more local citizens are economically empowered and that wealth is 
distributed amongst the country’s citizens 
59 Ibid. Following a request from BOMAID, the Commission determined that it has the power to hear appeals 
against merger decisions of the Authority and agreed to hear an appeal against the prohibition, the first merger 
appeal in Botswana. As at the time of writing, the Commission has not heard the appeal. 
60 Ibid http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/competition-world-newsletter-january-2013-74736.pdf it would 
be helpful for the Commission to balance the consideration of public interest factors with the determination of the 
effect of a merger on competition to ensure that the Act is applied with the objective of improving competition in 
the country’s economy In a press statement, the Authority noted that “since BOMAID is already in possession of 
majority shares in MRI Botswana, the shares currently held by CEDA Venture Capital Fund Limited should be sold 
to other citizens who are not already part of MRI Botswana. This is meant to ensure that more citizens are 
economically empowered and wealth is distributed amongst other citizens. The Authority is of the view that the 
parties to the transaction should seek other alternative citizen buyers to acquire the shares owned by CEDA Venture 
Capital Fund Limited”. Practical implications. Through these decisions, which are appealable to the High Court of 
Botswana, the Authority places much weight on citizen empowerment initiatives when assessing transactions in 
Botswana and it would therefore be wise or foreign parties to prepare, in addition to a comprehensive competition 
analysis, equally weighty countervailing public interest arguments indicating the benefits that the transaction would 
have upon the broader public interest in that country. 
61 http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/competition-world-newsletter-january-2013-74 pp 18. The merger 
control provisions in South Africa’s Competition Act require the Competition Commission to investigate not only 
whether a proposed transaction will result in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition in South Africa, 
but also whether it will impact negatively on various “public interest” matters. These “public interest” matters are 
the effect that the merger will have on: employment or a particular industrial sector or region; the ability of small 
businesses or firms controlled by historically disadvantaged persons to become competitive; and the ability of 
national industries to compete in international markets. 
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“public interest” considerations in South African merger control is spelt out in the Wal-Mart/Massmart 
case.62  
This case highlights the importance for domestic competition authorities to have a regional approach. The 
successes of the CA have resulted in the government proposing that the Consumer Protection (which has 
seen no prosecution since inception) should be administered by the Competition Commission. In 2002, in 
a speech to parliament, the Minister of Finance stated the objectives of NDP 9 as “towards realisation of 
Vision 2016” and achieving “sustainable and diversified development through competiveness in global 
market” Growth of non-mining sectors which grew at 7% compared to 5% for mining and saw mining 
contributions to GDP reduced from 34.4% to 31.8%.63 These projections also revealed that the share of 
the non-mining, excluding Government value added, will dominate GDP at 74.7 %, 76.3 % and 77.8 % in 
2013/14, 2014/15 and 2015/16, respectively.64 Therefore, foundations for the role of the CA preceded the 
creation of the CA as government strove to create a market structured economy though privatisation 
policies and laws such as the Privatisation Policy for Botswana and the International Financial Services 
Centre.  
 
3.3 Challenges / Weaknesses 
Despite the enormous strides taking place within the Botswana CA, some established monopolies owned 
by the powerful established elite in Botswana persist, such as in the field of day old chicks.65 The poultry 
meat industry in the region was found to be oligopolistic in nature with many of the same large firms 
operating at varying levels in four different countries. 66  The development of the poultry industry in 
Botswana was an import substitution measure protected by government legislation, which in prohibiting 
                                                           
62 Ibid. Parties undertaking a merger in South Africa should, at an early stage of planning their transactions, give 
proper consideration to whether their transaction may lead to job losses or changes to workers’ conditions of 
employment. If necessary, they should tender appropriate conditions which address any negative effects on the 
public interest, particularly if expedited clearance is required. 
63 http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0000257/P248_Development_Plan9.pdf p 3. Draft National Development 
Plan 9  2003/04 – 2008/09 Minister of Finance and Development Planning Delivered to The National Assembly on 
the 21st November 2002. NDP 9 (2004-2009) objective of moving “towards realisation of Vision 2016” and 
achieving “sustainable and diversified development through competitiveness in global markets”. p 27. 
64 http://www.undp.org/content/dam/botswana/docs/Publications/Botswana .pdf Mid-Term Review of NDP 10 
The Mining sector’s share of GDP will decrease from 15.1 percent in 2009/10 to 11.6 percent in 2015/16. 
Government contribution to GDP will decrease from 13.8 percent in 2009/10 to 10.6 percent by the end of the 
Plan.  
31 For the remaining years of NDP 10, a three-pronged strategy seeks to: Create a Private sector enabling and 
supportive policy environment; Stimulate increased domestic and foreign private investment; and Enhance 
competiveness in both goods and services markets. p. 5. 
65 Competitiveness can never happen if farmers here cannot have access to competitively priced inputs like feed and 
Day Old Chicks by Professor Roman Grynberg.- See more at: 
http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=6&aid=33&dir=2012/february/friday24#sthash.oyea9aRV.dpuf accessed 
12 /08/2015  
66http://www.competitionauthority.co.bw/sites/default/files/Botswana%20Competition%20Bulletin%20Issue%20
2%20Volume%202.pdf accessed 12/08/15 With regard to Botswana, the market study revealed that the poultry 
meat industry is unique with complex ownership structures. The largest producers in Botswana have ties to South 
African producers, the largest domestic producers face limited competition at the breeder and processing levels, and 
the tight trade restrictions protect the dominant players from competition. The research report further states that in 
Botswana (and Zambia), there is a general observation that dominant companies could be engaging in unilateral 
conduct bordering on over-pricing of poultry products at both feed and broiler breeding levels. 
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imports de facto created a statutory monopoly.67 Based  on  SA  prices  the  economic  loss  to  domestic 
consumers  is estimated to be Botswana  Pula  615 million  per  annum.68  
Where issues of capacity have been a challenge, Botswana has been open to harnessing external resources. 
From the outset, the CA did not have staff experienced to deal with complex matters. The first CEO was 
brought in from the Zambian Competition Authority;69 experienced Counsel are hired from SA at a great 
cost to the CA, and staff are provided with continuous training and development. In the application of the 
Competition Act, various legal challenges have faced the CA as Defendants have raised various loopholes 
in the Competition Act to avoid prosecution or penalties. 70  This has required amendments to the 
Competition Act, such as separating the Competition Commission‘s judicial function from its prosecutorial 
function by establishing a Competition Tribunal separate from the Commission to prosecute the offenders. 
 
 
4. Competition in Nigeria – identifying for drivers for reform 
Unlike Botswana, a competition law has never operated in Nigeria, despite the many initiatives to adopt 
and implement competition law legislation. Yet it was at about the same time as in Botswana that initiatives 
began, such as the drafting of a Nigerian Federal Competition bill with the aim of establishing a Federal 
Competition Commission. This was with a view to prohibiting restrictive contracts and business practices 
that substantially lessen competition, as well as regulating the abuse of dominant position of market power 
and anticompetitive business. A bill sponsored by the Federal Government through the bureau of Public 
Enterprise (BPE) was presented as an executive bill to the Nigerian Senate in 2002. However, there was no 
further actions on the bill since its presentation stage.  
In 2008, another bill was drafted for an Act to provide for the establishment of the Nigerian Trade and 
Competition Commission.71 This draft Nigerian law set forth the rules applicable to the regulation of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and a right to an appellate review (in a court of law) of all final decisions 
laid down by the Nigerian Competition Commission’s dispute resolution bodies. The Federal Competition 
Bill further introduces the regulation of anti-competitive practices into Nigerian law. The Bill serves to 
prohibit conduct, whether by contract, arrangement or other understanding, which has the effect of 
restricting trade or substantially lessening competition. Conduct specifically prohibited in terms of the Act 
includes: restricting output or production, price fixing, market division, collusive tendering, and denial of 
access to a market or to an input for production.
 
The Bill further introduces restrictions on the activities of 
                                                           
67http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/GrynbergMotswapong.pdf Competition and Trade 
Policy. Professor Roman Grynberg and Mr Masedi Motswapong: The Case of the Botswana Poultry Industry. p 7. 
While the poultry industry or other similar import substituting sectors cannot  be  seen  as  a  statutory  monopoly  
as  is  the  case  of  infrastructure  providers,  such  as Botswana Power Corporation, its existence is a result of 
government legislation providing for the prohibition   of   imports,   i.e.,   Control   of   Goods   (Importation   of   
Eggs   and   Poultry   Meat) Regulations  [SI  120,  1979,  7Th December],  1979.  Given  the  small  size  of  the  
Botswana  poultry market,  the  closure  of  the  market  from  imports,  combined  with  the  existence  of  
significant economies  of  scale  in  the  sector,  meant  that  the  Government  was,  in  effect,  creating  the 
conditions for what is at very least a ‘statutory oligopoly’, and may be a legal monopoly if one employs the 40% 
market share threshold as a criteria. 
68 Other instances are in the beef market dominated by BMC, the energy sector dominated by BPC, Water and in 
Motor vehicle business where Mercedes and Landrover still dominate. Ibid p. 23 
69 The Zambian Competition and Consumer Protection Commission has been a positive model for Botswana. The 
Zambian CCPC was established in 1997 by George Lipimile, the current CEO of COMESA Competition Authority. 
In May 2017, the International Competition Network (ICN) in conjunction with the World Bank has for the second 
year running awarded the Zambian Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) with the World 
Bank/ICN Award for its efforts in levelling the playing field through competitive neutrality in the world. See: 
https://www.ccpc.org.zm/index.php/media-releases/news/155-ccpc-wins-the-2017-world-bank-icn-award-for-
competitive-neutrality 
70 ibid n 26 above – Creative Business Solutions and Rabbit group bid rigging case for supply of infant formula. 
71 Federal Republic of Nigeria National Assembly see: 
www.nassnig.org/search/documents/?search=competition&doc_cat=All&chamber_id=All&year_range=&search_
type=documents&type=%7B%7Bdocument+type%7D%7D&submit=Go 
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dominant firms. Such firms may not abuse their dominance by restricting entry into a market, engaging in 
resale price maintenance, or by withholding or preventing the supply of goods.
 
Interestingly, the 
Competition Bill will apply to conduct entered into before it comes into effect, although businesses will be 
granted 18 months from the date of enactment to bring their businesses activities in line with the law. This 
Bill passed through its first reading in April 23 2008 and then its second reading on November 6, 2008. It 
was then referred to the joint committees on Establishment and Public Service Matters, Judiciary, Human 
Rights and Legal Matters and Commerce, which is when this bill stalled. It was followed by another 
competition bill in 201172 and then another in January 2012.73 However, no discernable progress was made. 
In July 2015, the Federal Competition Commission (Establishment) Bill, 2015 was given its First Reading,74 
while most recently, the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Bill of 2016, past the initial hurdle of 
receiving sufficient votes in the lower House of Representatives, and there is hope that it will be brought 
into effect by 2018.75 
 
These repeated attempts to pass a competition act indicates that there are advocates of competition law in 
Nigeria. It is increasingly understood that regulators such as the Consumer Empowerment Organization of 
Nigeria (CEON); the Manufactures Association of Nigeria (MAN); and the Consumer Protection Council 
(CPC) can only act ex ante, by setting prices for example. Competition law is important precisely because it 
also acts ex post, when an infringement to the competition law has occurred. It therefore acts alongside 
regulated sectors and regulated regimes. In 2008, a survey conducted by CEON 76  on the state of 
competition law in the country noted that the ‘protectionist approach’ to trade liberalization that had taken 
place in the country – such as imposing strict restrictions on import and export of various products - went 
against the national objective of improving the competitiveness of domestic firms. It argued that rather 
than improving the level of competition in the markets and bringing down prices of goods and services, 
privatization in the country had rather resulted in the concentration of economic power in the hands of 
few big private firms.   
 
The most important sectors of the Nigerian economy are regulated and controlled by major government 
agencies created by an Act of the National Assembly or Military decrees. These require formal amendments 
before any other competitor can be allowed into the sector.77 As a result, there are few measures in place 
to prevent anti-competitive agreements amongst these industries that may have formed cartels, nor fines 
or imprisonment deterrents. Thus, while on the one hand, Nigeria has committed itself to market 
liberalization in various sectors of the Nigerian government, and moreover the business sector and 
consumer organizations have recognized the important role of competition law in promoting development 
goals and fostering a regulatory environment strongly conducive for economic growth. On the other hand, 
there is still no law to prevent the new undertakings from engaging in cartel-like activities such as price 
fixing, market division, excessive pricing and even abuse of single or collective dominant positions. In the 
absence of a competition law regime such conducts are not illegal, no matter how detrimental they are to 
both consumers and the economy. 
 
 
4.1 Obstacles to Passing a Competition Law in Nigeria  
                                                           
72 A Bill for an Act to Encourage Competition in the Economy by Prohibiting Restrictive Trade Practices, 
Controlling Monopolies, Concentrations of Economic Power and Prices and for Connected Purposes. January 2011. 
Ibid. 
73 A Bill for an Act to Provide for the Establishment of The Nigerian Trade and Competition Commission; and for 
other Matters Connected Therewith. January 2012, www.nassnig.org/document/download/627 
74 House Order Paper No 7. 1. Federal Competition Commission (Establishment) Bill, 2015 (HB. 01) (Hon. Yakubu 
Dogarav - First Reading. www.nassnig.org/document/download/6556 
75 African Antitrust News and Analysis. June 2017. https://africanantitrust.com/category/nigeria/ 
76 National Stakeholders meeting on competition issues ‘Nigeria disadvantaged due to no competition law’. (23rd 
September 2008). 
77 Including Nigerian Telecommunications (NITEL), National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) and the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). 
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Despite the domestic efforts of the Federal Executives in implementing a competition law for Nigeria, so 
far the National Assembly have not been able to rise to this commitment to give the Bill accelerated passage. 
These domestic political economy constraints to competition policy in Nigeria are situated within the 
context of its transition to a market economy. The sectors mostly affected by the transition are the core 
sectors that command the highest resources. As a result, the liberalization and privatization agenda has been 
condemned for various reasons including faulty conceptual and legal framework to poor and non-
transparent implementation and outright corruption, leading to what is commonly known as ‘state capture’ 
in policy circles. Privatisation does not remove corruption. For instance, in Nigeria, the privatised banking 
sector has been accused of assisting the political office holders for money transfers, holding foreign 
accounts, and deliberately hoarding information on financial crimes. 78 The public sector sets out the 
legislative and regulatory framework for the private sector. Therefore, if the public sector is incapacitated, 
it is likely this will have a spill over effect on the private sector.  
Ironically, resistance to more failed privatization efforts is promoting popular aversion to any market 
reforms because in the past they are seen to have done more harm than good to normal citizens of Nigeria. 
This general aversion now serves those more corrupt elements with vested interests in the status quo. 
Clearly, the lack of sufficient internal will or pressure to implement a competition regime calls for tough 
advanced advocacy measures and activities. External dynamics still need to be harnessed within Nigeria, to 
ensure that the competition policy debate is presented as pro-poor, pro small businesses, and anti-unfair 
business or government excesses in the free market.  While an effective competition policy and law is 
important for economic governance as well as for an economic activity, yet, efforts to institutionalize a 
culture of competition has tended to target businesses in formal sectors. However, advocacy and 
stakeholder discussions need to harness consumers, small producers and the pro-poor agenda, domestically 
and within regional initiatives, to push pro-competition legislation forward in Nigeria.  
 
5. Ethiopia – low domestic competition, low cross border trade 
Given the historical absence of integrated consumer protection law in Ethiopia, the revised Competition 
and Consumer Protection Proclamation of 2013 brought in significant improvements to the earlier 2010 
Proclamation. Indeed, in most instances, the current Proclamation is fully in line with international 
benchmarks. That is, Proclamation No: 813/2013 aims to protect the business community from anti-
competitive and unfair market practices, consumers from misleading market conducts, and to establish a 
system that is conducive for the promotion of competitive free market. It further seeks to ensure that 
consumers get goods and services safe and suitable to their health and equivalent to the price they pay, and 
lastly, to accelerate economic development.79 
 
The Proclamation is divided into four parts. The first part sets out general definitions, objectives and scope. 
The scope of Proclamation No: 813/2013 also provides for extraterritoriality under Article 4(1) which 
states: This Proclamation shall apply to any commercial activity or transaction in goods or services 
conducted or having effect within the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. 80  Accordingly, an 
aggrieved party domiciled in Ethiopia may bring proceedings against the trader before the place of the court 
where the trader resides. On the other hand, the other party may only bring proceedings against the 
Ethiopian party before the Ethiopian courts. Under Article 4.2 of Proclamation No: 813/2013, the Council 
of Ministers may specify by regulation those trade activities it deems vital in facilitating economic 
                                                           
78 Arowolo, D.E. and Ologunowa, C.S. (2012), “Privatisation in Nigeria: A critical analysis of the virtues and vices”, 
International Journal of Development and Sustainability, Vol. 1 No. 3, pp. 785-796; Arowolo, D. (2010), “The State, 
Bureaucracy and Corruption in Nigeria”, Academic Leadership Journal, Vol. 8 No. 3, pp. 1-8. Nwoye, I. (2007), 
“Privatisation of Public Enterprises in Nigeria: The Views and Counterviews”, Nigerian Institute of Management, 
Nigeria.  
79 Proclamation 813/2013 Article 3. 
80 A commercial activity is an activity conducted by a business person as any person who professionally and for gain 
carries on any of the activities specified under Article 5 of the Commercial Code or who dispenses services or who 
carries on those commercial activities designated as such by law.80 
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development to be exempted from the application of the provisions of Part Two of this Proclamation.  In 
effect, the new provision does not affect the applicability of regulatory functions and administrative 
measures to be undertaken in accordance with other laws.81  
Part Two of the new Proclamation sets out the rules prohibiting anti-competitive trade practices and merger 
regulation, which prohibit the abuse of market dominance without specified justifiable reasons, including 
the maintenance of quality and safety of goods and services; achieving efficiency and competitiveness; any 
technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gain resulting from an anti-competitive agreement 
outweighs that effect; or it involves the setting of minimum resale price. Part Three of Proclamation 
addresses the protection of consumers and distribution of goods and services. The Proclamation provides 
that every consumer shall have the right to sufficient and accurate information; choice; protection; 
compensation. The Ministry and bureaus in collaboration with other appropriate inspection bodies can ban 
the distribution of goods and services that do not fulfil the standards of health and safety; prohibit hoarding 
or diverting of goods that have been declared by a public notice issued by the Ministry as scarce in the 
market.82 They may also regulate and fix prices upon approval and by a public notice. Part Four of the 
Proclamation sets out the necessary institutional framework for implementing and enforcing its provisions. 
With the enactment of the Proclamation, various organs were created or entrusted with enforcement 
powers, including the Federal Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority (TCCPA), the 
Federal Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Appellate Tribunal; Regional Consumer Protection 
Judicial Organs and Appellate Tribunals; the Ministry of Trade (MoT), Regional Trade & Industry Bureaus 
(RTBs) and Federal and Regional Courts. 
 
In terms of meeting legislative international best practice, the Ethiopian Proclamation No: 813/2013 is to 
be commended. This was achieved from within the supporting environment that UNCTAD provides in 
Ethiopia. With over 100 staff members in competition authority, there is now potential to build a pool of 
resource. In 2015, December, COMESA and UNCTAD jointly sponsored a merger expert from COMESA 
Secretariat to work with the Ethiopia CA to deal with merger cases and to review their merger guidelines.  
 
Yet, capacity building is, however, situated within a policy structure and system of governance that 
influences what competition law enforcement can achieve.83 Moreover, establishing a law and implementing 
a law are very different things. For although Ethiopia has enacted and amended laws that prohibit anti- 
competitive practices and behaviours, it remains the case that both the level of law enforcement and the 
level of competition in the country have been very low according to existing studies and empirical 
evidence.84 This research suggests there have been only eight cases related to consumer law, and there have 
been no cases on anti-competitive agreements entertained by the agencies and other organs. Except for 
cases of ‘hoarding’ against which the Ministry of Trade and some of the regional Trade and Industry 
Bureaus have taken serious measures. That is, there is no evidence that show measures are taken against 
prevalent anti-competitive business practices.85 Yet price fixing is prevalent in Ethiopia, which requires 
more attention and severer sanctions. The prices of goods and services are usually agreed by the traders 
                                                           
81 For instance, the proclamation is inapplicable to supervisory activities and measures undertaken in accordance 
with the Food, Medicine and Health Care Administration and Control Proclamation No. 661/2009, by the Food, 
Medicine and Health Care Administration Agency. 
82 Goods are presumed to have been hoarded or diverted contrary to regular commercial practices, where the value 
of the goods is not less than twenty-five per cent of the capital of the business person and where the goods are not 
made available for sale within three months of completion of customs formalities, in case of imported goods, or 
within two months from date of production, in case of locally produced goods.  
83 UNCTAD is implementing a competition law enforcement capacity building programme in Ethiopa under 
funding from the Duchy of Luxembourg. 
84 Tessema Elias, Gaps and Challenges in the Enforcement Framework for Consumer Protection in Ethiopia. Mizan 
Law Review, Vol. 9, No.1 September 2015   
85 Ibid citing: The Trade Practice Investigation Commission of Ethiopia, Four Years Performance Report of the Ethiopian 
Trade Practice Investigation Commission prepared on 24 September 2008 (2004-2008); Interview with Merkebu Zeleke 
who was the Director General of both former TPCPA and the present TCCPA, supra note 63; Interview with 
Representative of Regulatory Department, Ministry of Trade on Feb 23/2015 and Interview with Southern Nation, 
Nationalities and People Region Trade and Industry Bureau on January 28/2015.  
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including trade associations regardless of the quality of the products and services.86  The lack of effective 
law enforcement contributes to creating an environment in which many of the ongoing anti-competitive 
practices of established business communities can persist.  
 
In a federalised country as large as Ethiopia, it is of concern that the regional states in Ethiopia do not yet 
have their independent consumer protection law; nor do they have independent institutional frameworks 
for implementation. Even though the law envisages the establishment of a regional consumer protection 
judicial organ, it does not give administrative power to the organ; nor does it give the power to investigate 
and institute action against violators. The law also envisages the establishment of branches of the federal 
authority that have not been put into effect until now thereby leaving consumers in the regions outside the 
ambit of the envisaged protection. The Federal Constitution, under Article 51 (2) & Article 52 (2) (c), 
empowers both the federal government and the regional states to formulate economic and social 
development policies in their respective spheres. So while the regional and local levels are critical to the 
effective enforcement of competition laws, there appears to be no clear mandate given to regional 
governments to enforce anti-competitive laws. Efforts have also been made to decentralize and devolve of 
decision-making, accountability and revenue generation to the regional states and local level 
administrations.87 However, this is not the case for competition or consumer laws.  Thus, the lack of 
effective enforcement of competition laws at the national level is related to the lack of decentralization of 
consumer protection enforcement.88  
 
 
 
6. Enforcing Competition Law in Africa: Harnessing Regional Dynamics 
Free-trade areas and custom union plans typically declare that certain anti-competitive practices are 
incompatible with the proper functioning of the agreement or contrary to its free-trade objectives.89 These 
treaty expressions obviously range from ‘very soft’ to ‘very hard’ law. An example of such a ‘soft’ provision 
recognizes that certain anti-competitive practices will undermine the objectives of the RTA members to the 
treaty, and that the members should make (best) efforts to address anti-competitive practices. While this 
approach may or may not have political effects on the behaviour of the members and their laws, it does not 
have legal effects. Other customs unions and common market plans contain far stronger expressions that 
establish an independent regional law and then institutional regional power to enforce it. A ‘mixed’ 
harmonization model can be identified in some of the newer free-trade area plans (north–south in 
particular), where the trend is to substitute the role of an independent regional law with provisions on the 
criteria and performance of the domestic laws. In some cases, this explicitly requires the establishment of 
national competition laws that can treat cross-border anti-competitive practices according to certain 
substantive and institutional performance standards.  
In Africa, a diverse range of regional arrangements exist including the best practice provisions under the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the 
stronger regional framework based on the EU competition model under the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).  A 
point to note, there are developments towards a Continental Free Trade Area for Africa and the Tripartite 
Agreement linking SADC, COMESA and EAC. These two initiatives have competition and consumer 
protection components. Nevertheless, any frameworks developed will depend on the progress so far made 
                                                           
86 Roberto Zavatta and Samuel Feyisa ,Baseline Survey on Competition and Market in Ethiopia, Private Sector 
Development Hub/Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectorial Associations, 2009; Fikremarkos Merso, 
Imeru Tamirat Yigezu and Others, Review of the Legal and Institutional Framework for Market Competition in Ethiopia, 
Private Sector Development Hub/Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectorial Association, 2009;  
87Fiscal federalism in Ethiopia has a grant-sharing formula, which operates through the Regional Council and the 
House of Federation allocates resources taking into account considerations of equity and rights. AFDB/ UNDP 
African Economic Outlook, Ethiopia 2015, p.13 also available at, www.africaneconomicoutlook.org. 
88T. Elias. Op cit. 
89 K Dawar, JH Mathis. Is there Potential for Competition in ECOWAS? Competition and Regional Agreements, 
Ensuring Development Gains. UNCTAD. Geneva, 2008. 
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by national competition authorities and therefore national enforcement efforts are key to this process. 
Nevertheless, national enforcement efforts have the potential to be buttressed by regional initiatives. 
 
6.1 Nigeria and Competition Policy and Law Enforcement in ECOWAS 
The Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, is a sub-regional economic organization 
whose objective is to integrate the economies of its member states to promote the economic development 
of the region. Although ECOWAS was founded as early as 1975, it was more than thirty years later, in 2008, 
that legislators created a regional competition framework that aims at regulating competition within the 
region. The Preamble to the Supplementary Act A/SA.1/06/08 Adopting Community Competition Rules 
And The Modalities Of Their Application Within ECOWAS,90 notes, inter alia, that the High Contracting 
Parties are “desirous of endowing ECOWAS with competition rules that are consistent with international 
standards in order to promote fairness in trade and effective liberalization of trade.” Competition law 
therefore has become an explicit element in the process of creating a common market in West Africa, and 
could potentially auger well for promoting competition law enforcement in Nigeria. 
The objectives and purposes of the Supplementary Act Adopting Community Competition Rules pursuant 
to Article 3, include promoting competition at the regional level, prohibiting any anti-competitive business 
conduct that prevents, restricts or distorts competition at the regional level and ensuring consumer welfare. 
The Supplementary Act is applicable to agreements, practices, mergers and distortions caused by Member 
States which are likely to have an effect on trade within ECOWAS, and concern notably acts directly 
affecting regional trade and investment flows and/or conduct that may not be eliminated other than within 
the framework of regional cooperation.91 Article 7 also prohibits every merger, takeover, joint venture, or 
other acquisition or business combination where the resultant market share in the ECOWAS Common 
Market, results in abuse of dominant market position resulting in a substantial reduction of competition.  
The scope of the Supplementary Act is ambitious enough to cover both subsidies and public enterprises. 
Under Article 8, except as otherwise provided in the Supplementary Act, any aid granted by a Member State 
or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favouring certain enterprises or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between 
Member States, also be incompatible with the ECOWAS Common Market. While Member States may 
neither enact nor maintain any measure contrary to the rules contained in the Supplementary Act. 
Moreover, enterprises entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the 
character of a revenue-producing monopoly are also subject to these rules, but only in so far as the 
application of rules does not obstruct the de facto or de jure performance of their assigned tasks. 
Significantly, the Supplementary Act also envisages that any person or Member State who has suffered losses 
as a result of any anti-competitive practice prohibited under this Supplementary Act may, upon application 
to the ECOWAS Authority,92 receive compensation for such losses.93  
The ECOWAS Competition Authority has the mandate, inter alia, to carry out on its own initiative or at 
the request of private persons or government officials from the Member States or of the Community Court 
of Justice, in relation to the conduct of business in the Common Market to determine whether any 
enterprise is engaging in business practices in contravention of the Supplementary Act adopting the 
                                                           
90 The Supplementary Act A/SA.1/06/08 Adopting Community Competition Rules And The Modalities Of Their 
Application Within ECOWAS. Signed in Abuja 19th December 2008 at the Thirty Fifth Ordinary Session Of The 
Authority Of Heads Of State And Government. 
91 Article 4. The Supplementary Act A/SA.1/06/08 Adopting Community Competition Rules And The Modalities 
Of Their Application Within ECOWAS. 
92 The Supplementary Act A/SA.2/06/08 On The Establishment, Function Of The Regional Competition 
Authority For ECOWAS.  Signed in Abuja 19 December 2008 at the Thirty-Fifth Ordinary Session Of The 
Authority Of Heads Of State And Government. 
93 Article 10: Compensation For Victims Of Anti-Competitive Practices. The Supplementary Act A/SA.1/06/08 
Adopting Community Competition Rules And The Modalities Of Their Application Within ECOWAS. 
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Common Competition Rules. It may also co-operate with national and regional competition agencies in 
taking measures necessary to ensure implementation of the Supplementary Act. 94  The ECOWAS 
Competition Authority is endowed with the power to prohibit or terminate a contract that has the effect 
of reducing competition.95 With regard to State Aid, a person or Member State that has suffered losses as 
a result of a practice prohibited under the ECOWAS competition rules, may apply to the ECOWAS 
Competition Authority for compensation, where warranted.96 
For those wishing to promote competition within the ECOWAS Common Market, the biggest limitation 
to implementing and enforcing the regional rules set out under the Supplementary Act is that enforcement 
is governed by the rules of civil procedure in each Member State. It is incumbent upon each Member State 
to appoint a competent national authority to receive or implement the decisions of the ECOWAS 
Competition Authority and those of the Community Court of Justice. 97  Thus, despite the 2008 
Supplementary Acts and their commitments by the Heads of State of the Members, the ECOWAS 
Competition Regime is not fully enforced, although possibility of establishing the Competition Authority 
in Gabon has been raised.98  
Nigeria is an ECOWAS Member without a single competition law with a complementary competition 
authority to implement and enforce rules prohibiting anti-competitive business practices domestically. And 
therefore, its domestic businesses have not been exposed to domestic or regional competition rules, despite 
the fact that Nigeria is now the largest economy in Africa and Nigerian business activities take place in 
other countries and regions where competition policy and law is being enforced domestically – such as in 
Botswana, Zambia and South Africa, or regionally - through COMESA. In the four years since the 
COMESA Competition Commission became operational in 2013, it has developed into an active regional 
competition authority, successfully enforcing regional competition regulations in both mergers and 
acquisitions and anti-competitive business practices with a cross border effect. 99  Nigerian businesses 
operating within COMESA are therefore already subject to these regulations. 
 
The Dangote Group, for example, is headquartered in Nigeria but has a strategy of globalisation and is 
already one of the largest industrial conglomerates in Africa, valued at $15.4billion in 2016.100 A significant 
element of this business conglomerate is Dangote Cement, the African continent’s biggest cement maker. 
It was reported that Dangote had raised the price of its cement by 44% in Nigeria, 101  yet absent a 
competition enforcer, no investigation could take place in Nigeria. Nevertheless, Dangote Cement is the 
largest cement production company in Africa, with a market capitalization of almost $14 billion on the 
Nigeria Stock Exchange, and subsidiaries in Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia.102  
Foreign competitors have shown concern, in Zambia for example, Dangote Industries Zambia Limited 
states that price for its cement products is 30 percent stronger than regular Zambian cement. 103  A 
                                                           
94 Article 3. The Supplementary Act A/SA.1/06/08 Adopting Community Competition Rules And The Modalities 
Of Their Application Within ECOWAS. 
95 Article 4. The Supplementary Act A/SA.1/06/08 Adopting Community Competition Rules And The Modalities 
Of Their Application Within ECOWAS. 
96 Article 10. The Supplementary Act A/SA.1/06/08 Adopting Community Competition Rules And The Modalities 
Of Their Application Within ECOWAS. 
97 Article 11. Modalities For Enforcement Of Decisions Taken By The Authority And The Community Court Of 
Justice  
98 Clifford Chance. Insights and Updates in Africa 2017. 
99 The COMESA Commission Commission became operational on 14th January, 2013, under the leadership of Mr 
George Lipimile, CEO, and is based in Lilongwe, Malawi. The Commission enjoys the status of international legal 
personality and has in the territory of each Member State, the legal capacity required for the performance of its 
functions under the Treaty. Since the Regulations are now operational, it is the requirement that all cross-boarder 
transactions be notified for the necessary approval of the Commission: www.comesacompetition.org/?page_id=335 
100 Forbes 2016 quoted in www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/03/09/dangote-group-controls-43-of-nigerian-
stock-market/ 
101 https://africanantitrust.com/2016/09/19/drastic-price-increase-could-be-sign-of-collusion-or-dominance-
dangote-in-nigeria/ 
102 http://venturesafrica.com/10-african-companies-going-global-in-2013/ 
103 Dangote’s quoted price was between 58,2 kwacha (US$6) and 55,1 kwacha (US$5,6) per 50 kilogramme bag of 
cement, inclusive of Value Added Tax. The national average price according to the Central Statistics Office of 
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competition investigation would serve to determine whether these prices differences are due to competitive 
or anti-competitive behaviour. 
 
Dangote’s business practices, along with other Nigerian businesses abroad, must therefore operate 
according to these jurisdictions competition laws, including cartel control, abuse of dominance and merger 
regulation. Otherwise they will be investigated by the relevant competition authorities implementing their 
competition rules and remedies. This necessarily exposes Nigerian business practices to other principles of 
competition law, regardless of the lack of operational law in either Nigeria or ECOWAS. In such a situation, 
it could be that Nigerian business interests learn the culture and value of competition exogenously, and in 
so doing become part of the lobby for an effective domestic competition law, in line with Africa wide 
developments. It must nevertheless be asked whether this is one of the more indirect and uncertain 
strategies to promote competition law enforcement in Nigeria and among Nigerian businesses. 
 
6.2 Ethiopia and COMESA Competition Law Enforcement 
Ethiopia is a member of the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The country has signed all regional integration 
protocols, including the COMESA Free Trade Area Protocol, and in 2014 it submitted its accession 
instruments to the COMESA Free Trade Area. The COMESA Treaty for Competition Regulation has 
provided Ethiopian consumers’ protection in cross-border transactions since it was ratified in 2004. For 
where a business’s conduct directly affects regional trading, the Regulations will apply to that business 
regardless of their ownership or control, including government-owned businesses and foreign–owned 
businesses.  
 
However, given that Ethiopia is not perceived to be actively regionalizing or internationalising. COMESA 
has not been able to exert much competitive dynamic. For regional law will not typically apply to businesses 
that are trading wholly within only one-member country or not trading within any COMEA Member State. 
Ethiopia’s trading across borders, trade diversification and trade freedom indices are among the lowest in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank’s report Doing Business ranked Ethiopia as 166th out of 189 in terms 
of cross-border trading. Ethiopia continues to negotiate an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with 
the European Union, and its negotiations to join the World Trade Organization are also ongoing.  These 
challenges notwithstanding, UNCTAD is implementing a 3-year capacity building project funded by the 
Government of Luxembourg. With over 100 staff members in competition authority, there is potential to 
build a pool of resources. 2015 December, COMESA and UNCTAD jointly sponsored a merger expert 
from COMESA Secretariat to work with the Ethiopia CA to deal with merger cases and to review their 
merger guidelines. 
 
 
6.3 Botswana, SACU and SADC Competition Law and Policy Enforcement 
The SACU Treaty, to which Botswana is a party, includes a two-sentence Article 40 which states that the 
members shall have competition policies (a treaty obligation) and that they shall cooperate in the 
enforcement of competition laws and regulations. While this provision does not establish an independent 
regional law, it does allow for some additional development by protocol or otherwise to outline the 
characteristics of Member State cooperation. And while it does not allow for the establishment of a regional 
authority, it does not exclude the possibility of Secretariat assistance to facilitate cooperation. In 2005, 
UNCTAD worked with SACU to develop instruments to operationalize Articles 40. A cooperation 
                                                           
Zambia was 81,58 kwacha (US$8,6) for the same quantity See: The Business Reporter: Firms unnerved by imminent 
competition . . . as Dangote Cement looms on the horizon. September 27, 2015. Available at: 
www.sundaymail.co.zw/firms-unnerved-by-imminent-competition-as-dangote-cement-looms-on-the-horizon/ 
 
18 
 
agreement was proposed, but implementation has not been sanctioned by member states. Some texts say 
that work may have guided the current developments. 
The SADC competition authority has developed best endeavour provisions for its members to follow. 
These include model templates/guidelines for designing regulation for merger control, abuse of dominance, 
anti-cartel enforcement, consumer advocacy, leniency policy, for example. However, rather than following 
SADC’s lead, Botswana’s competition regime has, alongside the more established frameworks in Zambia 
and South Africa, served as a positive model of rapid implementation - particularly for other small African 
countries’ leaders and competition authority officials internationally. Botswana highlights that it is possible, 
with good domestic leadership and sound international expertise and capacity building, to harness internal 
forces to push competition law enforcement rapidly and in line with international best practice examples.  
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has highlighted the differences in the progress three African countries have made in 
implementing competition policy and law over the last 15 years. A leading light, Botswana has successfully 
galvanised both social and political will domestically to push forward a strong and enforceable competition 
law, and has evidently made great strides in introducing competitive dynamic forces to the Botswana 
economy. While this process has been largely internal, it has benefited from significant buttressing from 
external forces such as UNCTAD, the African Union, African Competition Forum (ACF) and international 
expertise. Botswana therefore offers a positive example to its neighbours and internationally of what can 
be achieved in a small landlocked country, dominated by a more developed neighbour, yet determined to 
pursue good economic governance above crony capitalism. 
The past fifteen years in Nigeria has resulted in little more than stillborn attempts at passing a Competition 
Bill, and as a result privatisation has proceeded without the acknowledged necessary support of a 
competition law. An absence of competition law enforcement has contributed to economic 
mismanagement, inefficiencies and a safe-haven for anti-competitive practices, particularly cartels and 
blatant corruption. This, in turn, has somewhat perversely contributed to popular suspicion of further 
market reforms, including competition law. In such a situation of disenchantment in the benefits of market 
liberalisation in Nigeria, further attention should be turned to harnessing exogenous factors that can help 
to push competition advocacy domestically. As such, it is important that economic stakeholders and 
Nigerian businesses operating abroad understand that they will be subject to competition laws as regards 
their external operations, and the benefits that this will afford them vis-à-vis other firms’ anticompetitive 
behaviour. This should alert key business figures as to the positive contribution a domestic competition law 
can make in harmonising these principles and in protecting Nigerian business interests from abuse.  
A third variant – Ethiopia – has adopted international best practice in competition and consumer protection 
laws and policies, yet implementation and enforcement has not been a natural consequence of having the 
law. Moreover, the lack of cross border trading activity does not expose Ethiopia to the comprehensive 
regional competition framework presented under the COMESA. To date it could be seen that Ethiopian 
political and social leaders are not active enough in promoting competition law and policy domestically. As 
a result, external support through international development aid and expertise, while available, is still not 
sufficient. As a result, its comprehensive competition law stands as a paper tiger until there is enough 
domestic will to enforce it and reap the benefits it can offer. 
Given the thrust towards integration across Africa, it is to be hoped that the current wave of pan-African 
regionalisation can be further harnessed domestically to promote competition law enforcement in the more 
recalcitrant countries of Africa. There are increasingly more African countries that have successfully 
established, implemented and enforced competition laws based on international best practice, harnessing 
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external forces to buttress reforms where necessary. More countries such as Zambia, South Africa and now 
Botswana, can and do serve as diverse positive examples of the realm of the possible. 
